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CHILD WELFARE REFORM:
PROTECTING CHILDREN OR POLICING THE POOR?
KAREN J. SWIFT* AND HENRY PARADA**
RtSUMi
Cet article analyse comment les families pauvres et leurs enfants ont &6 affect~s depuis
la mise en oeuvre de la r~forme de la 16gislation sur la protection de l'enfance. La
r~forme, qui eut lieu dans le contexte n~o-lib~ral des ann~es 1990, paraissait contenir
des changements qui s'imposaient h la fa~on dont les autorit~s prot~geaient les enfants
susceptibles d' tre victimes d'abus et de n~gligence. Tous les partis politiques, y
compris le PND, approuvrent les modifications apport~es A la Loi sur les services a
l'enfance eta lafamille (LSEF), qui entrhrent en vigueur par proclamation en 'an 2000.
Les modifications, connues comme le Projet de loi 6, furent adopt~es avec un minimum
de consultation et virtuellement sans opposition. Une grosse injection d'argent dans le
systhme de protection de I'enfance donna l'impression de hisser les services A des niveaux
raisonnables, tandis que des efforts massifs dans le domaine de la formation semblaient
s'attaquer aux problkmes de pratiques de travail incomp~tentes ou bAcl~es qui avaient &6
rv61es lors des enqu~tes sur les d~chs d'enfants qui avaient eu lieu en Ontario quelques
annes plus t6t. Toute une panoplie d'outils d'6valuation de risques, ainsi qu'un mode de
financement li6 aux prestations de services, furent aussi introduits.
Dans cet article, qui est bas6 sur une 6tude examinant l'exp~rience des travailleurs et
des mhres affect&s par la r~forme, nous analyserons la fois les nouvelles modifications
A la 1gislation et les politiques et pratiques annexes qui procurent du sens et donnent
effet la 16gislation. Une attention toute particulihre est port&e aux outils d'6valuation
de risques et au cadre de financement. Nous arguons que la r~forme touche dmesu-
r~ment les familles pauvres et cela de fa~on destructive, et qu'elle aide i rassembler les
conditions idales pour produire encore plus de mal. L'extension des raisons inscrites
dans la 16gislation pouvant donner lieu A l'intervention dans les families, ainsi que les
pratiques de surveillance intensifi~es, sont examin~es. Est ensuite d~crite I'augmentation
spectaculaire la fois du nombre d'enqu&es et du nombre d'enfants recueillis suivant
l'introduction de la r~forme. Dans nos conclusions, nous recommandons que l'orienta-
tion A long terme de la 16gislation sur le bien-&re de l'enfance devrait redonner aux
families une position souveraine et devrait donner une responsabilit6 accrue A la soci~t6
pour le bien-tre des enfants. Nous proposons aussi que les pratiques d'6valuation de
risques abandonnent leur concentration presqu'exclusive sur les comportements indi-
viduels ii risque pour se concentrer plus largement sur les politiques 6conomiques
et les programmes politiques qui mettent l'enfance A risque.
* Karen J. Swift is Associate Professor in the School of Social Work, York University and
*Henry Parada is Assistant Professor in the School of Social Work at Ryerson University.
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INTRODUCTION
It was in the context of dramatic media coverage of tragic child welfare outcomes and
a rapidly shrinking welfare state that Ontario's child welfare reform was introduced
in 1997. The reform involves a series of changes to both law and policy that have
transformed child welfare in this province within a very short time. The initiatives to
support this new and much more focused direction, as we will show, have produced a
high level of surveillance and intrusion into the lives of clients of the system.
On the face of it, the reform of Ontario's child welfare system contained some much
needed changes to the way children at risk of abuse and neglect are protected by
authorities. All political parties, including the NDP, signed on to the amendments to
the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA), which were proclaimed in 2000. The
amendments, known as Bill 6, were passed with little consultation and virtually no
opposition. A large cash influx into the child protection system appeared to be bringing
services up to reasonable levels, while a massive training effort seemed to address the
problem of uninformed or sloppy work practices revealed in the child death inquests
that had been held in Ontario a few years before. Various risk-assessment tools and
measures and a funding formula tied to services provided were also introduced. After
reform, it appeared we could turn our attention to more pressing matters, and indeed
most of the public did - no doubt to the relief of the sitting minister.
This article, based on a study exploring experiences of workers and mothers affected
by the reform, I examines the new amendments to legislation as well as the surrounding
policies and practices that bring meaning and effect to the legislation. We argue that
the reform disproportionately affects poor families in destructive ways and is helping
to reproduce the conditions for further harm. In our conclusions, we suggest how some
of the harmful effects of this approach might be alleviated and how the long-term
direction of child welfare legislation should be changed.
WHY REFORM?
Child Welfare Reform in Ontario resulted from several developments including deaths
of children in the system, high-profile inquests investigating these deaths, widespread
media coverage of child welfare issues, and the 1995 election of a Conservative
government in Ontario with a clear neo-liberal 2 agenda of reducing benefits for
low-income populations.
1. Interviews with protection workers and investigated mothers carried out as part of the ongoing
SSHRC-funded study, Risk and Risk Assessment in Child Welfare, also support our conclusions
(K. Swift & M. Callahan.)
2. The neo-liberal agenda privileges the role of the state as one of facilitating the market-based
economy over that of taking responsibility for the welfare of its citizens. Neo-conservatism
agrees with the focus on the state-market relationship and goes beyond that to morally regulate
relations between state and family. Both elements are represented in the child welfare reform.
However, we follow Ericson et al. and Clarke et al. in referring to risk regimes as neo-liberal.
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In the 1990s, a number of high-profile Canadian reviews of deaths of children
connected to the child welfare system were carried out. Perhaps the most prominent
of these was a review dealing with the death of a four-year-old in British Columbia.
This detailed investigation, published as the Gove Inquiry into Child Protection
(1995), 3 was widely publicized across the country and led to substantial reform of the
child welfare system in that province. Child death reviews have since been carried out
in a number of other provinces as well. Typically, reviews describe mistakes, misjudg-
ments, oversights, and uninformed practices by social workers, point to lax, vague, or
misguided legislation, and identify communications problems within organizations
as contributing factors leading to tragic outcomes. 4 These findings then lead to
recommendations to tighten up the law, reorganize tasks and departments, and
provide workers with training and tools to identify risky situations and act quickly to
prevent tragedy.
In Ontario, as in other provinces, reviews of protection-related child deaths were
conducted in the late 1990s. Eight cases of deaths of children associated with the child
protection system were investigated by the Coroner's office. A report by the Ontario
Association of Children's Aid Societies (1998) summarized the findings of the various
Coroners' juries, noting 120 recommendations addressing "needed" changes to pro-
tection legislation, 50 involving training for workers, 29 calling for a comprehensive
risk assessment system, and 29 also suggesting standards for handling cases of child
neglect, for a total of 428 recommendations. 5
These investigations and jury findings were closely followed by the media, with
special and dramatic attention paid to errors and mistakes of social workers involved
in these cases and to the laws and organizations governing their work. The Toronto
Star and other print media published accounts of the inquests in some detail. 6 For
These authors argue that the welfare state has been transformed into a managerial state with
emphasis on downloading responsibilities for welfare- and risk-management onto individuals in
order to focus energies on supporting corporate economic goals.
See J. Clarke, S. Gewirtz & E. McLaughlin, "Reinventing the Welfare State" in J. Clarke, S.
Gewritz & E. McLaughlin, eds., New Managerialism, New Welfare (London: Sage Publications,
2000) 1; R. Ericson, D. Barry & A. Doyle, "The Moral Hazards of Neo-Liberalism: Lessons
Learned from the Private Insurance Industry" (2000) 29:4 Economy and Society 532.
3. British Columbia, Report of the Gove Inquiry into Child Protection in British Columbia: A Com-
mission of Inquiry into the Adequacy of Services, Policies and Practices of the Ministry of Social
Services as They Relate to Apparent Neglect, Abuse and Death of Mathew John Vaudreuil (Victoria:
Ministry of Social Services, 1995).
4. K. Swift, "The Case for Opposition: Challenging Contemporary Child Welfare Policy" (2001) 47
Canadian Review of Social Policy 59.
5. Ontario, Report on Inquests into the Death of Children Receiving Services from a Children's Aid
Society by B. Porter (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1998).
6. J. Gadd, "Child Welfare Changes Urged: Advocate Needed, Coroner Says" Globe and Mail (1
May 1997), Al; J. Gadd, "Jury Makes Emotional Plea for Child Rights: Sweeping Changes Urged
at Close of Abuse Inquest" Globe and Mail (10 May 1997) Al; M. Bourrie, "Do More To Protect
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instance, two Toronto Star journalists following the story wrote, "The [Children's Aid]
Society was too committed to the return of the child ... the good intentions of keeping
them with family now appears to have been misguided ... the final result in some cases
[was] death".7 The Toronto Star called for "stiffer laws" and recommended a "radical
overhaul of the child protection system" in order to prevent the abuse and tragic deaths
of children.8
In another high profile Ontario case, which occurred in 1997, a child protection worker
was arrested and charged with criminal negligence in the starvation death of baby
Jordan Heikamp. 9 This event terrified protection workers across the country, suggest-
ing as it did that they themselves could be held criminally responsible for errors or
even for perceived errors in judgment in their handling of cases. Although the charges
were subsequently dropped, calls for better workers, tougher laws, and a reorganized
protection system were again made by the press.10
THE POLITICAL AGENDA
These recommendations for substantial changes in child welfare law and practice
occurred, of course, in the social and economic context of neo-liberalism, which is
more than an ideology, as Teeple (1995)11 notes, but also involves both the expansion
of transnational corporate interests and concomitant retrenchment of national and
local welfare structures in the interests of facilitating corporate agendas. A Canadian
example of this agenda was the federal government's decision in 1995 to replace the
Canada Assistance Plan with the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST). The new
provisions resulted in a 15% decrease in federal transfers to provinces for health,
education, and welfare. Naturally, provinces reacted by reducing funds for programs
in these portfolios. In turn, benefits to recipients of Social Assistance were reduced,
sometimes substantially. The CHST also erodes federal control over the expenditure
of these funds, leaving provincial governments relatively free to allocate funds as they
Kids, Children's Aid Told: Coroner's Jury Probed How Agency Failed Pair Killed by Father"
Toronto Star (25 June 1997) A5; M. Edelson, "Don't Make Aid Society Scapegoat for Cutbacks"
Toronto Star (15 May 1997) A31; D. Freed, "Mom Who Killed Tot Refused Offer of Help: Told
Children's Aid She Could Manage on Her Own, Inquest Told" Toronto Star (11 April 1997) A9;
M. Welsh, "Children's Aid Put Girl in Care of Schizophrenic: Report Suggested Tot Be Made
Crown Ward, Inquest Told" Toronto Star (17 September 1997) B3.
7. M. Welsh & K. Donovan, "Cry for the Children. They Are Fragile, Desperately Needy. Yet
Youngsters under the Protection of Ontario's Child-Care System Are Likely To End Up Even
More Damaged" Toronto Star (19 April 1997) Al.
8. D. Freed, "Stiffer Laws Urged as Shanay's Legacy. Inquest Jury Calls for Radical Overhaul of
Child Care system" Toronto Star (10 May 1997) Al.
9. J. Quinn, "Caseworker Charged in Baby's Death: Infant Died of Starvation While Under Super-
vision of Catholic Children's Aid" Toronto Star (9 August 1997) Al.
10. Supra note 8.
11. G. Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform (Toronto: Garamond, 1995).
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wish. As the Caledon Institute has pointed out, this legislation in effect removes the
guarantee of a safety net for Canadians. 12 Of course, clients of the child welfare system
are among those who most require the safety net.
In 1995 in Ontario, the newly elected Harris government did not wait long to imple-
ment both the neo-liberal agenda, on which it campaigned, and the provisions of the
CHST. Beginning immediately after its election, the Ontario government began a
relentless program of legislative and policy change designed to reduce funding and in
some cases to dismantle elements of the welfare state under its jurisdiction. As is well
known, social assistance rates were reduced by nearly 23%, and this reduction has
remained in place ever since. As of 1999, Ontario single parents, who are mostly
mothers, with one child received $13,704 in assistance annually, some 60% under the
established poverty line. 13 As a report just released by the Canadian Association of
Social Workers demonstrates, even single mothers employed outside the home have
by far the lowest incomes among Canadian families. 14 And not only was social
assistance cut. Programs designed to assist parents, and especially women, found their
budgets and grants decreased, as did those developed to assist recent immigrants.
Shelter programs and social housing have been especially hard hit. Because most
clients of the child welfare system are poor, and because they generally have other
difficult life problems to contend with, these reductions in funds and services were
especially problematic for them. 15
The Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) 2000
Prior to 2000, the last major revisions to the Ontario Child and Family Services Act
were made in 1984. The emphasis in that legislation was on the application of a high
threshold for intervention, based on a standard of "substantial risk of harm" to the
child. The legislation also emphasized a principle of "least intrusive" intervention
consonant with both the safety of the child and the principle of working to keep the
family together whenever possible. These policies were harshly criticized in a number
of the child death reviews and inquests conducted in the 1990s.
In an effort to address these concerns and "toughen up" the legislation governing the
protection of children in Ontario, several changes were introduced in the recent
amendments to the existing Act. In the 2000 amendments, the principle of child safety
took priority over both the "least intrusive" principle and the principle of supporting
12. S. Torjman & K. Battle, Can We Have National Standards? (Ottawa: Caledon Institute for Social
Policy, 1995).
13. J. Graham, K. Swift, & R. Delaney, Canadian Social Policy: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Toronto:
Prentice Hall, 2003) at 59.
14. <http://www.casw-acts.ca>.
15. S. Chau et al., One in Five ... Housing as a Factor in the Admission of Children to Care: New
Survey of Children's Aid Society of Toronto Updates 1992 Study. Research Bulletin #5, Centre for
Urban and Community Studies (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2001).
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the "autonomy and integrity of the family unit". Under the new amendments to the
Act, the paramount purpose is "to promote the best interest, protection and well being
of children" (CFSA, 2000 section 1 (1)).16 Although the revised legislation still recog-
nizes the family unit as a preferred environment for the care and upbringing of
children, the principle of supporting the family unit is now considered secondary to
the safety and protection of the child. 17
Following from this change, a wider scope of circumstances allowing intervention by
child welfare authorities has been introduced into law. Prior to the addition of the new
amendments, the CFSA set the threshold for child welfare intervention as "substantial
risk" of harm. This standard has now been amended to read that intervention can
occur when there is "a risk that a child is likely" to suffer harm (section 37(2)(b)). In
addition, a new focus on "pattern of neglect" and on maltreatment by "omission"
appears in the legislation (section 37(2)(a)). Along with the introduction of "pattern
of neglect", the Act also introduced a statement allowing intervention by authorities
when harm caused to a child is the direct result of a caregiver's failure to protect
(section 37(2)(b)(i)(ii)). In other words, caregivers have been made more accountable
for harm, including emotional harm, experienced by a child in their care. In addition,
a section dealing with duty to report suspected abuse or neglect by members of the
general public and professionals has been expanded. It now requires that professionals
report every single incident affecting a particular family as an "ongoing obligation"
(CFSA section 72(2)). Professionals are not allowed to delegate this responsibility
(CFSA section 72(1)).
Under the previous legislation, cases were brought to court only after substantial
efforts had been made to protect the child within the context of the family. Given the
expansion of grounds for intervention and reduced emphasis on the "least intrusive"
approach, it is no longer necessary to demonstrate efforts to work with the family
before proceeding to court. When cases come to court, three kinds of dispositions can
be made. These are Orders of Supervision, Society Wardship, which involves tempo-
rary and limited suspension of parental rights, and Crown Wardship, which means
permanent removal of parental rights to the custody of the child. Under previous
legislation, children could remain as Society Wards for long periods of time while
services were provided to the parents. Ominously for many parents, the time allowed
for a child to remain as a Society Ward before Crown Wardship proceedings must ensue
has now been defined in the Act. Sections 29(6)(1)(2) and 70(1) (2). indicate that a final
decision shall be made by the court for Crown Wardship for children who are in
temporary care, according to strict timeframes. No temporary care agreement as
described in section 29 (6)(a)(b), and Society Wardship (as described in section 70
(1) (a)(b)) shall be extended for "a period exceeding (a) 12 months, if the child is less
16. Child and Family Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 90.
17. These changes were recommended by Judge Hatton in her report: M. J. Hatton, "Protecting
Vulnerable Children: Report of the Panel of Experts on Child Protection" (1998) [unpublished].
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than 6 years of age ... (b) 24 months if the child is 6 years of age or older". These
periods of 12 or 24 months are cumulative.
Ontario Risk Assessment Model (ORAM)
An apparently strongly supported and agreed upon direction for child welfare in
Ontario was the implementation of a risk assessment tool to guide workers in their
investigations of potential abuse and neglect of children. 18 The province elected to use
the New York state model, which it introduced into practice virtually unchanged. In
addition, the system includes a locally developed Eligibility Spectrum, which is used
to determine whether a referral is eligible for service by child welfare authorities. 19
Please see Figure 1.
Risk assessment tools have been widely introduced into child welfare practice not only
across North America but in virtually all English-speaking countries. The logic of this
approach is that knowledge gained from experience and past practice can be organized
into coherent tools for predicting and preventing future harm to children. Models are
generally of two types. One is "actuarial", which relies on numerical calculations based
on large population samples, and the other is the clinical or consensual approach,
which allows the user to employ professional judgment in rating elements of risk. 20
Ontario has chosen the second type.
According to an official statement, the goal of the Ontario Risk Assessment Model is
[t1o promote and support a structured and rational decision-making approach to
case practice, without replacing professional judgment. [This model] supports deci-
sion-making by guiding the social worker through a process of information gather-
ing and analysis that examines the relationship of risk influences and individual
elements affecting family functioning. 21
Workers are provided with training and documents designed to ensure that particular
pieces of information about potentially risky situations are gathered, rated for severity,
and analyzed in relation to one another to produce an overall assessment of risk. The
model used in Ontario is computerized, and it requires intensive labour to pull together
the required information within time frames established by Ministry guidelines.
18. Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, Risk Assessment Model for Child Protection
(Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1997) [CSS, Risk]; Ontario Ministry of
Community and Social Services, "Developing a Common Risk Assessment Tool for Use in Child
Welfare" (1997) 41:1 Journal of the OACAS 8; Ontario Ministry of Community and Social
Services, "Implementation of Ontario's Risk Assessment System (1997) 41:3 Journal of the
OACAS, 33.
19. Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies, Ontario Child Welfare Eligibility Spectrum
(Toronto: Ontario Association of Children's Aid, 1999).
20. P. Parsloe, ed., Risk Assessment in Social Care and Social Work (London: Jessica Kingsley Publish-
ers, 1999) 13.
21. CSS, Risk, supra note 18.
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Funding Framework
Along with the introduction of standardized risk assessment in Ontario came the
announcement of a new funding formula. The formula is integrally connected to risk
assessment and to accounting and audit procedures designed to both control spending
and guide child welfare activities in particular directions. The new funding formula
introduced the assignment of budgetary responsibilities to social workers, requiring
them to calculate and translate their interventions into costs and benefits that can be
given an actuarial value.22
Accountability of Children's Aid Societies to the Ministry through the funding formula
focuses not on client needs and traditional helping values shared by many workers but
on financial goals established by governing authorities. The internal flexibility that
agencies had to assign their funding to needs they considered important in their
jurisdiction was drastically reduced. Consequently, the professional decisions of pro-
tection workers necessarily now include a substantial and direct connection to the
provisions of the funding formula. For example, very specific timelines are established
for each task expected of workers, and funding is provided only for the amount of time
allowed in the formula. Substantial funding is provided in the model for investigations,
while the tasks of working over the long term to support families are provided for less
generously. Funding is provided for children in care, while support services for
children living at home are meagre and generally contracted out.
The Ministry of Community and Social Services introduced a series of benchmarks,
as part of the funding formula, that allow it to determine how a particular agency is
performing in relation to the formula and in relation to other agencies in the region.
Audit practices were introduced to monitor the new Funding Formula. Audit practices
also extended to include the timeframe and decision-making process of social workers
and supervisors. 23
EFFECTS OF THE REFORM ON LOW-INCOME PARENTS
Low-income families are more likely than other families to be affected by changes in
child welfare practice and policies because they constitute a much greater proportion
of clients of the system. Historical studies such as Gordon's examination of case
records from the early part of the nineteenth century document the frequent and
22. H. Parada, The Restructuring of the Child Welfare System in Ontario: A Study in the Social
Organization of Knowledge (Ph.D. Thesis, Ontario Institute in Studies of Education, University
of Toronto, 2002) [unpublished].
23. Ontario Ministry of Community and Social Services, Guide to Child Welfare Funding Framework
(Toronto: Ministry of Community and Social Services, 1998); Ontario Ministry of Community
and Social Services, The Risk Assessment Model, rev. ed. (Toronto: Ministry of Community and
Social Services, 1999); Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies, "Funding Formula Must
Link with Legislation, Regulations and Standards of Service" (1997) 41:1 Journal of the OACAS,
19; supra note 22.
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invasive activities of child welfare authorities into Boston's poor population. 24 A study
of the child welfare records in 1930s Toronto demonstrates a similar clientele, 25 while
contemporary evidence suggests a continuation of the same pattern. The Canadian
Incidence Study, carried out to establish a baseline of child welfare practice across the
country, showed that 20% of clients were in receipt of welfare, which in all provinces
is set below the official poverty line. While that study did not document income levels
of clients, the evidence presented demonstrated that many clients are also young,
single-parent families, often in rental housing and in low-wage types of employment.
A recent U.S. study showed that less than 20% of the sample of families with prior
child protection investigations had employment income. 26 These studies support the
experience of many social workers that poverty is a primary issue for the majority of
families with whom they work in protective services.
In the following section we explore some effects of the reform on these low income families.
These are based on expansion of legal grounds to intervene, additional practices of surveil-
lance and increasing likelihood that children will be apprehended and taken into care.
EXPANSION OF GROUNDS TO INTERVENE
Bill 6 was clearly intended to expand grounds for intervening in family life, ostensibly
in the interests of children's safety. Two examples of how this expanded intervention
disproportionately affects low-ihcome families are explored. The first and most obvi-
ous example is the introduction of "pattern of neglect" into the legislation. Until the
amendments of 2000, neglect was not specifically mentioned in Ontario's Child and
Family Services Act. This amendment (section 37 (2)(b)(ii)) grew out of concerns
raised in the child death reviews in the 1990s about the association of long-term
neglect and deaths of particular children known to child protection authorities. The
Gove report, which influenced thinking about child welfare across the country, dealt
with the death of a young child whose neglect by his mother appears to have been
"allowed" by the child welfare system itself.27 In Ontario, the Hatton report, which was
commissioned by the Ministry of Community and Social Services to review the CFSA,
recommended that "pattern of neglect" should be included as a factor in finding a
child in need of protection, and this recommendation was accepted. 28 The amendment
included in Bill 6 defines a child as being in need of protection if the child is at risk of
physical harm because the caregiver shows a "pattern of neglect in caring for, providing
for, supervising or protecting the child" (section 37(2)(a)).
24. L. Gordon, Heroes in Their Own Lives (New York: Penguin, 1988).
25. K. Swift, "An Outrage to Common Decency: Historical Perspectives on Child Neglect" (1995)
74:1 Child Welfare, 71.
26. B. Rittner, "The Use of Risk Assessment Instruments in Child Protective Services Case Planning
and Closures" (2002) 24:3 Children Youth Service Review, 189.
27. Supra note 4.
28. Supra note 17.
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This definition is especially problematic for poor people because, as is well established
in literature, neglect is notoriously difficult to distinguish from poverty.29 This is
because its indicators so closely match those of poor households. 30 The Eligibility
Spectrum, which is the screening document used to determine if an investigation will
be done, illustrates this point. Following from the amendment, protection workers are
asked to evaluate the potential of caregivers to "meet immediate needs for food,
clothing, shelter and/or medical care". Instructions for filling out this item of the
Eligibility Spectrum contain a long list of evidence that protection workers are
supposed to look for to determine neglect (Section 2, Harm by Omission, at 28, 29). 3 1
Items in this list include: "almost no food is available in the home", "soiled diapers not
changed for several hours" "peeling lead-based paint", and "child lacks many basic and
essential items of clothes or apparel for the season". It is obvious that these conditions
are indeed dangerous for children and equally obvious that poverty rather than
parental intentions can be the cause.
The Canadian National Incidence study demonstrated that in 40% of child protection
cases neglect is the primary complaint. 32 With the specified definition of neglect now
included in the Act and with complex supporting documents instructing workers on
how to identify a pattern of neglect, we can expect to see many more families identified
as "neglectful." The fact that a "pattern" of neglect must be established suggests that
deprivation can go on a long time before child protection actions are taken. In
addition, the legal mandate requires only that action be taken if the parent or caregiver
is shown to be responsible for a child's deprivation. If the problem is "merely" poverty,
child protection authorities are under no obligation to intervene. Thus, while a
substantial number of poor families will be investigated under this clause, it does not
follow that children whose safety is compromised as a result of poverty will be helped.
A second and related example of expanding grounds for intervention is witnessing by
children of violence that occurs in their own homes. Literature in the field of child
care, social work, and related fields has lately taken up research on the harm done to
children who witness "adult conflict " 33 Until this issue became prominent, protection
29. Supra note 4.
30. K. Swift, Manufacturing "Bad Mothers": A Critical Perspective on Child Neglect (Toronto: Univer-
sity of Toronto Press, 1995).
31. Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies. Ontario Child Welfare Eligibility Spectrum
(Toronto: Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies, 1999).
32. Supra note 30.
33. C. Tower, Child Abuse and Neglect, 3rd ed. (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon, 1996); B.
M. Groves, "Mental Health Services for Children Who Witness Domestic Violence (1999) 9:3
Future Children 122; J. L. Edelson, "Children's Witnessing of Adult Domestic Violence (1999)
14:8 journal of Interpersonal Violence 839; G. Margolin, "Effects of Domestic Violence on
Children" in P. Trickett & C. Schellenback, eds., Violence against Children in the Family and the
Community (Washington: American Psychological Association, 1998) 57.
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workers did not intervene in cases of "domestic violence" unless children were harmed
or likely to be harmed when it occurred.
The 2000 amendments to the CFSA in Ontario, although not specifically referring to
domestic violence, changed this scenario. Two sections that were added set the stage
for this change. These were, first, strengthening of the section dealing with emotional
harm to children (section 37(2)(f)), which now specifies that intervention may occur
when there are "reasonable grounds to believe" a child has suffered emotion harm as
a result of the parents' actions, "failure to act or pattern of neglect". Second, the section
identifying parents as responsible for what happens to their children (37(2)(b)(i)(ii))
has been strengthened. While this section appears genderless, it is generally mothers
who feel the effects of it, since it is much more often they who are themselves at risk
of physical harm from a partner and they who generally remain in charge of children
at the point of separation. This section certainly disadvantages poor families from the
outset, since their limited resources render them less able than middle-class families
to provide necessities for their children.
It is actually the ORAM documents that make it necessary to view domestic violence
as violations of these sections of the Act. The Eligibility Spectrum, section 3, Scale 2:
Adult Conflict, which is based on section 37(2)(a, b, f, f.1, g, and g.1) of the Act,
specifically instructs workers to deal with family violence as potentially emotionally
harmful to the child. This item ensures that workers consider domestic violence as a
reason for opening cases. The risk assessment document itself, which is supposed to
predict future harm, also contains an item (F1) that deals specifically with "family
violence" asking workers to give a high risk rating if an "imbalance of power and
control" is present in the family.
A 2002 study demonstrated an increase in reports between 1993 and 1998, attributable
even prior to the introduction of the reform to "the dramatic increase in domestic
violence investigations" being conducted. 34 The use of ORAM documents has led to
a further increase of case openings in Ontario based on children witnessing domestic
violence. According to one study, "The incidence of violence and the consequent risk
of emotional abuse are shown to be increasing ... from 22 to 38% of families".35
Concern about this increase is often expressed by workers in women's shelters, who
are now in the difficult position of deciding whether a mother arriving for reasons of
violence should be reported to child protection authorities. Shelter workers were
especially concerned to report because the CFSA had also strengthened clauses dealing
with the "duty to report" of professionals.
34. N. Trocme et al., "The Changing Face of Child Welfare Investigations in Ontario: Ontario
Incidence Studies of Reported Child Abuse and Neglect" Centre of Excellence for Child Welfare,
Faculty of Social Work, University of Toronto, 2002 at 10.
35. B. Leslie & B. O'Connor, "What Are the Products of the Ontario Risk Assessment Tool?" (2002)
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It is certainly true that not only poor women are victims of violence at home. However,
poverty is prominently cited in a report released by the Ontario Association of Interval
and Transition Houses (OAITH) as the leading barrier to women leaving abusive
situations.3 6 The OAITH report also cites poverty associated with discrimination
against "Aboriginal women, women of colour, disabled women, immigrant and refu-
gee women and young women" as significant barriers to escaping violence. These
barriers increase the likelihood of child protection system intervention. Because
protection workers are now instructed to focus on child safety primarily, and often
exclusively, this intervention may revictimize rather than assist the mother. One mother
in our study who had been raped by her boyfriend said, "They took away my child and
told me there's a cab waiting outside to take me for a psychiatric assessment ... why don't
(CAS workers) take me and my daughter at the same time?"
PRACTICES OF SURVEILLANCE
As well as expanding grounds for protection authorities to investigate the care that
poor families are providing their children, child welfare reform introduced an appa-
ratus of ongoing surveillance of families who are reported to authorities. In part as a
result of the expanded duty to report, substantially more complaints are now being
received for investigation. In the 1998-99 fiscal years the total number of complaint
calls received in Ontario's 54 mandated child protection agencies was 192,869. By the
2002-03 fiscal year, 236,430 calls were received - an increase of approximately 22%. 37.
Increased numbers of complaints result generally in an increased number of investi-
gations. In 2002-03, Ontario CASs completed 82,534 investigations. In addition to this
substantial number of investigations, the reform has increased the work involved in
carrying out a protection investigation. There are now more steps, much more em-
phasis on the forensic aspect of the investigation, a series of intrusive questions
repeatedly administered to parents and to children from a preset list of questions, and
more invasive actions that follow. If grounds for concern are identified, family mem-
bers will be asked questions from three or four different documents, each more
detailed than the last. If new information comes to the attention of the agency during
an ongoing investigation, the worker must initiate a new investigation. If a case is
ongoing and new information appears, the worker must also readminister the entire
set of ORAM procedures. This repeated investigation process is exacerbated by the
"duty to report" provisions, which require that professionals report each time they
perceive a risk of harm. 38
36. E. Morrow, "In the Best Interests of Children and Mothers: A Proposed Child Welfare Response
to Violence against Women." Ontario Association of Interval and Transition Houses (OAITH).
March, 2003.
37. Ontario Association of Children's Aid Societies, CAS Facts April 1, 2002-March 31, 2003, rev. ed.
(2003), online: OACAS http://www.oacas.org/resources/casstats.htm
38. Supra note 22.
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Once a family enters into contact with child protection authorities, they will be tracked
throughout the province by means of the computerized provincial Fasttrack system.
All the information obtained by workers is entered into a computer program that is
designed to ensure that all recording is completed. All this information is available to
intake protection workers in any part of the province. Information is never expunged
and serves as basis for future investigation and intervention.
Not surprisingly, there has been an increase in the number of cases opened to
Children's Aid Societies in Ontario over the past five years. As of 31 March 1998,
Ontario Children's Aid Societies registered 18,244 ongoing open cases. By 31 March
2003, this number had increased to 24,329, representing a 33% increase since the
reform was introduced. 39 This growth may be a result of not only the intensive nature
of investigation introduced by the reform but also of an identified trend over the life
of risk assessment to rate more and more cases as high risk. A study completed in 2002
showed that protection workers are increasingly rating cases at higher risk levels. By
2001, 84% of cases opened were rated as "moderately high or high risk." The authors
of this study argue that the risk tool "is losing sensitivity to the overall risk." 40
However, this effect may also be linked to a preference in the funding formula to pay
costs of higher risk cases.
The effects of high risk ratings for families are significant, since higher ratings increase
the likelihood that their case will remain as an open file and surveillance of their lives
will continue and may be more intense as long as the risk rating is high. These ongoing
cases involve readministering the entire battery of risk assessment questions to each
family member, including children, every six months. This means families remain
under continuous surveillance for all issues included in the ORAM documents and
not simply those issues for which the case was originally opened. As one key informant
in our research noted, "[W]ith the new risk assessment they don't just ask about the
conditions of the home and do you have enough food and stuff. They have to go
through the full assessment, so that involved asking questions about sexual abuse and
physical abuse." As in past times, surveillance is not conducted just by protection
workers. Personnel of any support service offered to the family are expected to document
and report to child welfare authorities detailed accounts of caregiver actions and behav-
iours and information about the apparent well-being of the child or children.
CHILDREN IN CARE
Of course the most intrusive measure that can be applied by child protective services
is the removal of children from their parents. In Canada, British Columbia, Alberta,
and Ontario are the provinces that have adopted the most complex risk assessment
models. They are also the provinces with the highest increase in numbers of children
39. Supra note 37.
40. Supra note 35.
Child Welfare Reform: Protecting Children or Policing the Poor?
in care over the past few years. 41 In Ontario, a dramatic increase in children appre-
hended and taken into care by authorities has occurred since 1998. On 31 March 1998,
11,609 children were in care in the province. By 31 March 2003, this figure had
increased some 56% to a total of 18,126.42 This very steep increase is no doubt linked
to the reform's focus on intensive investigations, but is facilitated by the funding
formula guidelines for financing children in care more generously than for children
offered support in their own homes.
Given that most families involved with child protection authorities are poor, it is a
certainty that most children in care come from low-income families. Because the new
amendments restrict the amount of time children can remain in care before they
become permanent wards, these parents face strict time pressures to demonstrate the
ability to provide adequate care. As our data show, parents may be asked to provide
more spacious or safer housing that is simply not available or accessible to them. They
may find that the treatment required to solve mental health or addiction problems
cannot be accessed or cannot be effective in the time allowed. This pressure creates
sometimes insurmountable challenges for low-income parents to reunite with their
children, problems made much more difficult in the current era of cutbacks to services,
low-wage employment, and restructuring of the welfare state.
CONCLUSION
Is child welfare reform really about making children safe? As has been argued else-
where, 43 it is highly questionable whether merely providing increasingly intensive
investigations of parents will produce safety for children. DeMontigny (2004) 44 af-
firms that child welfare reform was introduced just after the most draconian measures
in decades were taken in Ontario to reduce the social safety net.45 The 23% reduction
in welfare rates alone has created an array of hazards and risks for children of parents
on social assistance that child welfare reform does not in any way address.
Researchers and advocates for low-income groups have begun to produce a critique of
risk assessment procedures and expanding grounds of intervention as measures more
likely designed to protect the safety of government officials themselves.4 6 The account-
41. K. Swift & M. Callahan. (In Press). "Problems and Potential of Canadian Child Welfare." In N.
Freymond and G. Cameron (Eds.) Towards positive systems of child and family welfare: Interna-
tional comparisons of child protection, family service, and community caring systems. Toronto, ON:
University of Toronto Press.
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45. D. Ralph, A. Regimbald & N. St-Amand, Open for Business, Closed to People (Halifax: Fernwood,
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46. C. R. Goddard, B. J. Saunders & J. R. Stanley, "Structured Risk Assessment Procedures: Instru-
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ability, auditing, and reporting measures introduced by the reform operate to distance
governing authorities from liability for harm and death of children, placing the onus
directly on protection workers. These procedures also direct our attention away from the
effects of social and economic reforms on the most vulnerable families in the province,
firmly focusing instead on individual parents, their failures and problems. Several court
cases have challenged child welfare practices "for reasons of poverty". A study concluded
that "child welfare agencies have removed children from their homes and have failed to
reunite children from their families for reasons of poverty."47 Social workers themselves
inadvertently collude in this process as they follow the repetitive investigative procedures
assigned and attend to the complicated, repetitious "paperwork" now required of them
within the short times required by the funding formula. Time for support and in-depth
counselling for clients is increasingly unavailable, and time for social advocacy is cer-
tainly not covered in the funding formula.
This legislation and its supporting risk assessment processes are clearly consistent with
neo-liberal objectives of reducing state responsibility for social welfare, and the poor
are invariably at a disadvantage in this scenario. Making parents solely responsible for
the care of children, while deconstructing, diminishing, and devaluing both social
supports and social responsibility for children, is patently unjust. If social justice and
equity are goals, then child protection and its supporting apparatus must go beyond
parental responsibility and deal with social and economic inequities. This can happen
in at least two ways.
First, advocates and child protection personnel themselves must connect and act with
potential allies. Rather than being seen as an isolated, specialized, and legalized field,
child protection work could be viewed as one of several related policy arenas dealing
with the same or overlapping vulnerable populations. Active coalitions with such
potential allies as antipoverty groups, social housing advocates, cultural communities,
and women's organizations would change both the public discourse and the nature of
interaction within protection agencies. Research efforts that explore and demonstrate
common underlying purposes and similarities with other legislation affecting low-in-
come, vulnerable individuals and families should also be pursued. Included in this
research might be the "squeegee" law 48 and welfare- and workfare-related legislation
as well as child protection.
Second, the legislation itself should be changed. At the very least, language that restores
parents and families to a paramount place in child protection is essential. More impor-
tant, the Act should include a wider social responsibility.49 Since the Act is to be reviewed
ments of Abuse?" (1999) 8 Child Abuse Review 251.
47. M. Eamon & S. Kopels, "'For Reason of Poverty': Court Challenges to Child Welfare Practices
and Mandated Programs" (2004) 33 Child Youth Services Review 825
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at the five-year point, there is an upcoming opportunity for input and active involvement
by advocacy groups, including both social workers and lawyers concerned with poverty
law. Governments that are going to require specific behaviours of their citizens have an
obligation to ensure availability of the resources required to meet those parental expec-
tations. This kind of proposal was debated in Ontario during the 1980s when the first
version of the CFSA legislation was under consideration, but of course it was not
included in the final version of the law. An alternative proposal is advocating for separate
legislation such as Quebec's Law to Fight Poverty and Social Exclusion (Law 112),50
which states that the fight against poverty is a "national imperative".
Finally, the Risk Assessment Model has been criticized on many fronts, including its
focus on individual and disadvantaged parents. In the course of our research on risk
assessment, however, we have been cautioned many times not to recommend the total
elimination of the approach. In keeping with this caution we recommend instead a
redirection of the risk assessment gaze to the social and economic context affecting
the low-income population.
Definitions of risk are of course hotly contested, and those with the legitimacy to
define risk are winners in a contemporary social struggle. They can call up experts,
conduct research, and define the kinds of risks to which society and its members
should be attuned. In Beck's conceptualization of the "risk society" the welfare state
itself has become mainly a risk management system. 5 1 In the dominant version of risk
assessment, individuals are asked to become their own personal risk managers, to
marshal the necessary resources for controlling their particular risks, and to spare
society the expense of their mistakes. It is important to realize that this is only one
version of risk and risk management, one promoted in this neo-liberal era. An
alternate definition of risk could examine the risks inherent in our failure to provide
adequate health care, housing, schooling, food distribution and jobs for our citizens.
Rather than focusing on "risky decisions" of individuals, a revised risk assessment for
child protection might focus on political and economic decisions of sitting govern-
ments and transnational corporations that put children at risk. There is a large
literature that attempts to link poor child welfare outcomes to social deprivation.5 2 A
valuable expenditure of our time might well be to explore this literature and put our
imaginations to work in developing an approach to social, political and economic risk
assessment.
50. C. Bouchard & M. Raynault, The Fight against Poverty: A Model Law (Ottawa: Canadian Council
on Social Development, n.d.).
51. U. Beck, Risk Society: Toward a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992).
52. L. Caragata & B. Skau, "A Chip in the Canadian Veneer: Family and Child Poverty as Social
Exclusion" (2001) 9:1 Social Work and Social Sciences Review 36.
